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ABSTRACT 
 
Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: 
Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts* 
 
It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human 
cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-
level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal 
of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of 
social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is 
maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are 
truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more 
trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, 
we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with 
trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents’ trust in 
the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses 
to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings 
corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can 
ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences. 
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Introduction 
Humans frequently cooperate with non-kin others and incur costs to benefit them. The question of how 
such cooperative behavior can be explained has attracted considerable attention across several decades 
and disciplines (see West et al. 2011 for a critical review). A large body of literature has shown that 
cooperation can be a manifestation of self-interest if it is likely to be reciprocated with a benefit that 
outweighs its costs in the not-too-distant future (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Nowak & 
Sigmund 1998). However, these explanations are restricted to interactions between members of 
relatively small groups, where cooperators and defectors can be identified and respectively targeted by 
reward or punishment (Bowles & Gintis 2011: 63-70; Leimar & Hammerstein 2001; Panchanathan & 
Boyd 2003). Moreover, empirical evidence has accumulated suggesting that cooperative behavior may 
be motivated by psychological predispositions to benefit others (henceforth, social preferences) 
(Camerer 2003: Ch. 2). However, since cooperative behavior is often costly, the evolution of social 
preferences in humans is difficult to explain in an individual-selectionist framework (although see 
Delton et al. 2011). This has led to a renewed interest in models of multi-level selection (Wilson 1975; 
Gintis 2000; Boyd et al. 2003). 
Models of multi-level selection assume that there is both competition between individuals (within 
groups) and between groups, and groups with a higher proportion of cooperative individuals will be 
more likely to survive inter-group competition and adverse environmental conditions. For cooperation 
to be sustained in a population, positive assortment of cooperators, i.e. the higher likelihood of 
cooperators interacting with cooperators than with non-cooperators, must outweigh the ratio of costs c 
(for the cooperator) to benefits b (for the rest of the group) of cooperation (Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza 
1982; Bowles & Gintis 2011: 52-59). However, since models of multi-level selection are 
mathematically equivalent to models of kin selection where genetic relatedness is implied by the 
limited dispersal of individuals within groups, some authors have argued that it is not necessary to 
resort to multi-level selection to explain the evolution of cooperation (West et al. 2011). We leave it to 
others to answer questions regarding to what degree population structures led to positive assortment of 
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genetically related individuals in human prehistory and whether multi-level selection is necessary to 
explain how social preferences and cooperation have evolved. Instead, we argue that cooperative acts 
can be credible signals of an individual’s social preferences and, through favorable treatment of these 
individuals in social exchange, ease the conditions for their evolution, whether in a kin or a multi-level 
selection framework. 
Altruism as a signal of trustworthiness 
Gintis et al. (2001) show that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable but relevant 
quality, if this quality is causally related to an individual’s ability to cooperate (see also Leimar 1997; 
Roberts 1998; Lotem et al. 2003; Smith & Bliege Bird 2005). In the simplest case, there are high-
quality and low-quality types who incur low costs (c1) or high costs (c2 > c1), respectively, from 
sending the signal. If the benefits (s) from being interacted with, conditional on having sent the signal, 
compensate the high-quality types but not the low-quality types (c2 > s > c1), only the high-quality 
types can afford to send it and thus will be identified as such. If, moreover, sending the signal yields a 
higher net benefit for the sender than not sending the signal, type-separating behavior can evolve in 
which high-quality types send a signal, low-quality types do not send a signal, and agents are only 
interacted with if they sent a signal. Gintis et al. (2001) also analyze the evolutionary dynamics of 
their model and show that cooperation as a type-separating signal is evolutionarily stable under 
plausible conditions. 
These predictions also hold if social preferences are the unobservable quality of interest. Agents with 
social preferences are the high-quality types, who derive a psychological reward (r1 > 0) from 
benefiting others, whereas individuals lacking social preferences are the low-quality types, who only 
care about their own payoffs (r2 = 0). Although the material costs are the same for both types (c2 = c1 = 
c), the psychological rewards make it “cheaper” for the high-quality type to cooperate (c > c – r1). The 
condition that must hold for cooperation to be a type-separating signal is c > s ≥ 0. In other words, 
high-quality types cannot be fully compensated in material terms for the costs they incur. In fact, their 
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cooperative acts must be truly altruistic (henceforth, altruistic acts). This requires that the existence of 
individuals with social preferences is maintained by another evolutionary mechanism (e.g. kin and/or 
multi-level selection). However, as long as s > 0, cooperators receive partial compensation, which we 
call signaling benefits. We will show next that altruistic acts can induce signaling benefits through 
social exchange and that this can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences. 
Social exchange among unrelated individuals has been an important part of human sociality for tens of 
thousands of years and arguably a driving force in the evolution of the human mind (Cosmides & 
Tooby 1992). The upper half of Figure 1b shows a Person X and a Person Y engaging in social 
exchange that is not based on a formally binding agreement (Dasgupta 1988; Coleman 1990: Ch. 5). 
The social exchange can be mutually beneficial if Person X makes a transfer x first and Person Y 
makes a back transfer y, which is tripled to reflect the gains from trade. While a selfish Person Y has a 
real incentive to keep x without sending back y, a Person Y with social preferences will make a back 
transfer y, such that 3y > x. For Person X, a trust problem arises as he or she does not know whether 
Person Y is cooperative and will make a back transfer that is sufficiently high. Referring to the vast 
social science literature on social exchange (e.g. Ostrom and Walker 2003; Fehr 2009), we call Person 
Y’s cooperative behavior trustworthiness and we call Person X’s transfer, which is motivated by the 
expectation of gain from Person Y’s back transfer, trust (see also definitions in bottom half of Figure 
1b). 
Now suppose that Person X, before engaging in social exchange with Person Y, observes Person Y in 
the situation depicted in Figure 1a. Here, Person Y has the opportunity to perform an altruistic act in 
the form of a charitable donation. Then, Person X can condition his or her transfer in the social 
exchange on whether Person Y acted altruistically (Y1) or not (Y2). Since only a Person Y with social 
preferences will both give to charity and make a back transfer in social exchange, Person X can infer 
Person Y’s type from his or her donation to charity or the lack of it. Consequently, while Person Y2 
will be disregarded by Person X, Person Y1 will be partly compensated for his or her altruistic act by 
the gains he or she makes from trade (i.e. c′ = c – s, where c are the costs of the altruistic act and s = x 
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– y are the signaling benefits). In addition, since Person X benefits from the social exchange with a 
trustworthy interaction partner, the benefits for the group (excluding Person Y) increase as well (i.e. b′ 
= b + 3y – x, where b are the group benefits from Person Y’s altruistic act and 3y – x are Person X’s 
gains). Now, as c′/b′ < c/b, signaling eases the conditions for the evolution of social preferences, 
because it lowers the degree of positive assortment necessary to maintain such traits in the population. 
 
Fig. 1. Person X decides how much to transfer to Person Y in social exchange (b) contingent on Person Y’s decision to give 
to charity or not (a).  
This evolutionary argument implies that what we should observe today is that altruistic behavior and 
trustworthiness are correlated. Moreover, individuals acting altruistically will be trusted more in social 
exchange because they will be expected to have social preferences and thus to be trustworthy. Note 
that the reverse is not true in general. That is, observing someone behaving trustworthily does not 
necessarily tell us that this person has social preferences – he or she could be selfish and behave 
trustworthily to acquire a reputation for being trustworthy and to be trusted more in the future (Bolton 
et al. 2004). However, here we exclude this possibility with a one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) game 
design, in which a selfish Person Y has no incentive to act trustworthily and thus altruistic acts can be 
a signal of trustworthiness via social preferences only. 
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Previous findings 
There is ample evidence for a positive correlation between altruistic behavior and trustworthiness 
measured in laboratory experiments with economic games (Barclay 2004; Ashraf et al. 2006; 
Chaudhuri & Gangadharan 2007; Albert et al. 2007; Blanco et al. 2011; Fehrler unpublished; 
Gambetta & Przepiorka unpublished). Four of these experiments were also designed to investigate 
whether subjects who act altruistically are thereafter trusted more by third parties in social exchange, 
and they find support for this conjecture (Barclay 2004; Albert et al. 2007; Fehrler unpublished; 
Gambetta & Przepiorka unpublished). Barclay & Willer (2007) and Sylwester & Roberts (2010) 
provide similar evidence from experiments with public good games. However, there is experimental 
evidence showing that subjects who help others or donate more to charity receive more in return from 
third parties (Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2002). Thus, observing subjects in social 
exchange responding positively to altruistic acts does not tell us to what extent these responses reflect 
trust and to what extent they are mere transfers of resources intended to unconditionally reward the 
altruistic individual. Moreover, there is compelling experimental evidence that some subjects prefer 
egalitarian outcomes (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Dawes et al. 2007; Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Since 
altruism entails giving away resources or incurring costs, positive responses to altruistic acts could 
also be a manifestation of inequality aversion. However, while trust is motivated by pure self-interest, 
rewards or responses based on inequality aversion are not and would thus remain in need of an 
evolutionary explanation. 
In our computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of 
charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness. Moreover, we test whether a charitable 
donation increases the observing agents’ trust in the donor. Our experimental design allows us to 
disentangle trust from rewarding and outcome-equalizing transfers as responses to altruistic acts. 
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Methods 
Cox (2004) was the first to experimentally combine the dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994) and the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) to disentangle 
trustworthiness expectations from other motives behind trusters' decisions. He finds that trusters send 
higher amounts in the investment game than in the dictator game and attributes this difference to 
trusters' trustworthiness expectations. In our experiment, we take a similar approach. We give Person 
Y subjects the opportunity to donate part of their endowment to a charitable organization and 
disentangle the motives behind responses to these altruistic acts by using Person X subjects' transfers 
in the dictator game and the exchange game (a variant of the investment game). 
Experimental games 
Table 1: Dictator and exchange game 
Dictator game (d)  Exchange game (e) 
Person X   Person Y  Person X   Person Y 
GX  GY  GX  GY 
– xd → + xd  – xe → + xe 
GX – xd   GY + xd  GX – xe  GY + xe 
    + 3y ← – y 
    GX – xe + 3y   GY + xe – y 
 
Table 1 presents the dictator game (d) and the exchange game (e). In the dictator game, Person X and 
Person Y are endowed with GX and GY Swiss francs (CHF), respectively. Next, Person X can decide 
to give up part or all of his or her endowment (0 ≤ xd ≤ GX) and transfer this amount to Person Y. The 
dictator game ends with Person X getting GX – xd and Person Y getting GY + xd. The exchange game 
extends the dictator game by giving Person Y the possibility to make a back transfer. That is, Person Y 
in the second mover position can decide to give up part of his or her amount (0 ≤ y ≤ GY + xe) and 
transfer it to Person X. Unlike the transfer of Person X in both games, the amount transferred by 
Person Y is tripled. The exchange game ends with Person X getting GX – xe + 3y and Person Y getting 
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GY + xe – y. Note that xd and xe denote Person X’s transfer to Person Y in the dictator and exchange 
games, respectively. Given that, in the dictator game, Person Y does not have a possibility to make a 
back transfer, Person X’s transfer xd cannot be motivated by trustworthiness expectations. Moreover, 
if initial endowments are equal (i.e. GX = GY), Person X’s transfer in the dictator game cannot be 
motivated by inequality aversion either. 
Measuring trust and trustworthiness 
Cox (2004) suggests that the difference between a transfer in the exchange game and in the dictator 
game measures trust because it nets out responses that are based on other motives, leaving the part of 
the exchange game transfer that is only based on trustworthiness expectations. However, this measure 
implies that the various motives additively affect subjects’ transfer decisions. This assumption has 
been criticized on the grounds that the two games may put subjects in different mental frames (Fehr 
2009). It is plausible that the dictator game evokes more altruistic motives in subjects than the 
exchange game, with the effect that the transfer difference between the two games would 
underestimate trust. 
In our study, we try to meet this objection in two ways. First, we balance the framing effects of the 
two games by presenting all decision situations to subjects on the same screen. This compels subjects 
to compare the different situations with each other. Second, we also measure trust in an alternative 
way. We regress the transfers in the exchange game on the expected back transfers, controlling for 
other motives by adding the dictator game transfer as a control variable. Then, we hold Person X 
subjects’ dictator game transfers constant and measure their trust as the part of the exchange game 
transfer that can be attributed to their trustworthiness expectation only. This measure closely matches 
our definition of trust. Moreover, the regression model allows us to assess the extent to which other 
motives affect exchange game transfers. A coefficient estimate for dictator game transfers smaller than 
one would indicate that other motives affect transfers in the exchange game to a lesser extent than in 
the dictator game. In this case, the transfer difference alone would serve to underestimate trust. 
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We measure expected trustworthiness by asking Person X subjects what amount they expect each 
Person Y type to transfer back for hypothetical transfers of CHF 0, 8, and 16. We measure 
trustworthiness as a Person Y’s back transfer conditional on a Person X’s transfer. 
Experimental design and procedure 
To disentangle the motives behind responses to altruistic acts, we vary subjects’ endowments, games, 
and the possibility to donate to a charitable organization in a 2(GX = GY vs. GX > GY) × 2(dictator 
game vs. exchange game) × 2(Y can donate vs. Y cannot donate) factorial, within-subject design. 
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects are randomly assigned to be a Person X or a Person Y and stay in their 
role throughout the experiment. In addition, Person Y subjects are randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions (see Figure 2 below). In Condition 1, Person Y has the possibility of a one-time donation to 
a charitable organization. In conditions two and three, Person Y has no such possibility. In Condition 
2, Person Y is endowed with the same amount as Person X (GX = GY = CHF 16) and in Condition 3 
Person Y’s endowment is lower than Person X’s endowment (GX = CHF 16 > GY = CHF 10). At the 
beginning of the experiment, Person Y subjects in Condition 2 can decide whether or not to make a 
donation of CHF 6 to one of three organizations. They can choose from Amnesty International (AI), 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Note that 
subjects who decide to donate are left with an endowment of CHF 10 or otherwise keep CHF 16. This 
corresponds to the endowments in conditions 3 and 2, respectively. Consequently, Person Y subjects 
differ with respect to the maximum amount they can send back to a Person X in the exchange game. In 
Condition 1, this difference is determined by the possibility to make a donation and in conditions 2 
and 3 this difference is determined by design. Subjects in the role of Person X face eight different 
decision situations. Figure 2 presents the eight decision situations schematically.  
Subjects make all possible decisions before they are randomly paired with another subject and payoffs 
are calculated and presented to them. The eight decision situations are presented to Person X subjects 
on one screen simultaneously. On the subsequent screen, we ask Person X subjects to state their 
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expectations with respect to Person Y subjects’ back transfers in the exchange game with hypothetical 
transfers of CHF 0, 8, and 16. Finally, Person Y subjects are asked to decide upon the amount they 
want to send back to Person X for every possible amount a Person X could transfer to them. The 
experimental procedure is described in more detail in the appendix. 
 
Fig. 2. Person X’s decision situations (1d through 4e). The letters ‘d’ and ‘e’ stand for ‘dictator game’ and ‘exchange game’, 
respectively. The numbers 1 through 4 stand for different Person Y types. Subjects’ endowments are equal (G = CHF 16) or 
Person Y has a lower endowment (GY = CHF 10), either after a charitable donation (Type 1) or by design (Type 4). 
Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis is that donors to charity are more trustworthy than non-donors. We test our first 
hypothesis by regressing Person Y subjects’ back transfers on an interaction of Person Y subjects’ 
type (donor vs. non-donor) with Person X subjects’ transfers.  
Our second hypothesis is that Person X subjects expect donors to be more trustworthy than non-donors 
and therefore trust them more. Following the discussion in section 2.2, we test our second hypothesis 
in two ways. First, we calculate and compare the differences in actual exchange game and dictator 
game transfers to donors and non-donors (see Figure 2 above). However, a comparison of these 
differences between donors and non-donors (1e – 1d vs. 2e – 2d) may be influenced by higher trust in 
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non-donors due to non-donors’ higher endowments (i.e. non-donors have more to send back). 
Therefore, we also compare transfer differences in the two games between donors and Person Y 
subjects without an option to donate and a low endowment (1e – 1d vs. 4e – 4d), as well as between 
non-donors and Person Y subjects without an option to donate and a high endowment (2e – 2d vs. 3e – 
3d). Second, we regress Person X subjects’ exchange game transfers on their transfers in the dictator 
game and their trustworthiness expectations towards each Person Y type. Based on this regression 
model estimation, we compute the differences in Person X subjects’ exchange game transfers to each 
Person Y type that can only be attributed to differences in trustworthiness expectations. 
Previous studies’ findings suggest that the transfer decisions of Person X subjects may be caused by 
inequality aversion and/or a preference to reward altruistic acts. We expect to replicate these findings. 
That is, we expect to find higher transfers in the dictator game where Person Y has a lower 
endowment by design (inequality aversion: 4d > 3d) and to find still higher transfers in the dictator 
game where Person Y has a lower endowment because he or she donated to charity (preference to 
reward altruistic acts: 1d > 4d). Also, in accord with the results obtained in previous experiments with 
charitable giving (Albert et al. 2007; Milinski et al. 2002), we expect to find higher transfers to donors 
than to non-donors in both the dictator (1d > 2d) and the exchange game (1e > 2e). 
Results 
Charitable giving and trustworthiness 
Of the 42 Person X subjects who had the opportunity to make a donation, 26 (62%) chose to do so. 
Figure 3 shows Person Y back transfers at Person X transfer levels of CHF 0, 8 and 16. The joint 
hypotheses test of back transfer differences between donors and non-donors at all 17 transfer levels (0 
through CHF 16: F17,41 = 2.04, p = 0.032) indicates that donors send back significantly higher amounts 
than non-donors (see Table A2 in the appendix). Moreover, the slope coefficients for donors and non-
donors in the regression of back transfers on transfers are significantly different at the 10% level (t = 
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1.71, p = 0.094). This shows that donors reciprocate higher transfers with higher back transfers than 
non-donors (see Table A3 in the appendix). 
 
Fig. 3. Person X beliefs about Person Y back transfers and Person Y actual back transfers conditional on Person X transfers 
of CHF 0, 8 and 16. Person Y back transfers conditional on all 17 transfer levels are listed in Table A2 in the appendix. 
Trust I 
Our first measure of trust is the difference between exchange game and dictator game transfers. Figure 
4 shows Person X subjects’ average transfers in the eight different decision situations (the first two 
bars in each three-bar grouping) and Table 2 lists the transfer differences discussed in the following. In 
accord with previous studies’ findings, we observe a substantial and statistically significant difference 
between exchange game transfers to donors and non-donors (Table 2, row 1). However, since dictator 
game transfers between donors and non-donors differ to a similar extent (Table 2, row 2), we cannot 
be certain whether the difference in exchange game transfers can be attributed to a difference in 
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trustworthiness expectations or other motives. Hence, we first compare the difference of dictator game 
and exchange game transfers between donors and non-donors (Table 2, row 3).  
 
Fig. 4. Person X mean transfers in the eight decision situations (1d through 4e) and predicted transfers. The letters ‘d’ and ‘e’ 
stand for ‘dictator game’ and ‘exchange game’, respectively. The numbers 1 through 4 stand for different Person Y types. 
 
Table 2: Transfer differences 
   F1,55 p 
1 1e – 2e 2.45 20.03 < 0.001 
2 1d – 2d 1.96 75.02 < 0.001 
3 1(e – d) – 2(e – d) 0.48 0.88 0.353 
4 1(e – d) – 4(e – d) 0.32 0.65 0.425 
5 2(e – d) – 3(e – d) –1.27 14.72 < 0.001 
6 4d – 3d 0.86 13.68 0.001 
7 1d – 4d 0.52 7.39 0.009 
8 2d – 3d –0.59 10.79 0.002 
Notes: The numbers 1d through 4e in the second column denote Person X transfers in 
each of the eight decision situations (see Figure 2). The Wald tests of simple and 
composite linear hypotheses are based on the OLS regression model presented in Table 
A6 in the appendix. 
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This measure of trust yields a positive but statistically insignificant difference between donors and 
non-donors. Comparing the transfer differences of donors and Person Y subjects without the option to 
donate and a low endowment yields a similar result. The difference is positive but also statistically 
insignificant (Table 2, row 4). However, when we compare the transfer differences of non-donors and 
Person Y subjects without the option to donate and a high endowment, we find a substantial and 
statistically significant negative difference (Table 2, row 5).  
According to the discussion in section 2.2, the difference between exchange game and dictator game 
transfers alone may underestimate trust because other motives may affect exchange game transfers to a 
smaller extent than dictator game transfers. Moreover, looking at a direct measure of trustworthiness 
expectations may be more informative. If Person X subjects’ expectations about donors’ and non-
donors’ trustworthiness do not differ as predicted by our second hypothesis, then arguments based on 
costly signaling can be ruled out. 
Trust II 
Figure 3 above also shows the expected back transfers as stated by Person X subjects at hypothetical 
transfer levels of CHF 0, 8 and 16 and for each Person Y type. A clear picture is given by the joint 
hypotheses test of the differences in Person X expectations regarding each Person Y type at the three 
transfer levels. Person X subjects expect significantly higher back transfers from donors than from 
non-donors (F3,55 = 4.45, p = 0.007) and they also expect significantly higher back transfers from 
donors than from unequally endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate (F3,55 = 3.74, p 
= 0.016). Person X subjects expect to receive most back from equally endowed Person Y subjects 
without a possibility to donate (see Table A4 in the appendix). Moreover, regressing expected back 
transfers on hypothetical transfers yields a significantly larger slope coefficient for donors than for 
non-donors (F1,55 = 12.56, p < 0.001) and for donors than for unequally endowed Person Y subjects 
without a possibility to donate (F1,55 = 5.06, p = 0.029). This indicates that subjects expect higher 
transfers to be reciprocated by higher back transfers from donors and provides evidence for motives 
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based on trustworthiness expectations in the exchange game (see Table A5 in the appendix). But do 
Person X subjects act on their trustworthiness expectations? 
To answer this question, we regress Person X subjects’ transfers in the exchange game on their 
transfers in the dictator game and their trustworthiness expectations about the four Person Y types (see 
Model M1 in Table A7 in the appendix). First of all, the coefficient estimate for dictator game 
transfers is 0.616 and significantly smaller than one (F1,55 = 34.17, p < 0.001). This indicates that other 
motives affect transfers in the exchange game to a lesser extent than in the dictator game and that the 
difference between exchange game and dictator game transfers is an overly conservative measure of 
trust. Therefore, based on this model estimation, we compute the part of Person X subjects’ exchange 
game transfers that can only be attributed to their trustworthiness expectations. In Figure 4, the third 
bar in each three-bar group shows this measure of trust towards the four Person Y types. These figures 
show that, on average, Person X subjects transfer CHF 0.45 more to donors than to non-donors 
because they expect donors to be more trustworthy than non-donors (z = 2.79, p = 0.005). For the 
same reason, Person X subjects transfer on average CHF 0.29 more to donors than to unequally 
endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate (z = 2.53, p = 0.011). The largest difference 
in exchange game transfers that can be attributed to the difference in trustworthiness expectations is 
between non-donors and equally endowed Person Y subjects without a possibility to donate and 
amounts to CHF 0.56 (z = 2.21, p < 0.027). These results support our second hypothesis. 
Other motives 
Finally, our study replicates previous findings. First, the amounts transferred in the dictator game with 
Person Y having a lower endowment are significantly higher, indicating that inequality aversion is 
important (Table 2, row 6). Second, the fact that, in the dictator game, donors to charity receive higher 
transfers than subjects without an opportunity to donate suggests that some subjects have a preference 
to reward altruistic acts (Table 2, row 7). Our evidence also suggests that non-donors are punished 
(Table 2, row 8). 
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Discussion 
Empirical evidence suggests that human cooperation can be motivated by social preferences, and the 
evolution of social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. However, it 
has been shown that cooperation can also evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable but relevant 
quality, if this quality is causally related to an individual’s ability to cooperate. We propose that if a 
proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-
level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can signal trustworthiness, and the signaling 
benefits that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences. 
In social exchange, trust problems arise as an actor does not know whether his or her potential 
exchange partners are cooperative or not. However, since a person with social preferences will both 
engage in altruistic behavior and be cooperative in social exchange, the actor can infer his or her 
potential partners’ types from their altruistic behavior and choose a trustworthy partner accordingly. 
Then, the gains from trade partly compensate the altruistic individuals for their altruistic acts and 
increase overall group benefits through the actor’s gains. This eases the conditions for the evolution of 
social preferences, because it lowers the degree of positive assortment necessary to maintain such 
traits in the population. 
This account of the evolution of altruistic behavior in humans implies that what we should observe 
today is that, first, altruistic behavior and trustworthiness are correlated and, second, altruists are 
expected to be more trustworthy and therefore are trusted more in social exchange. However, 
observing agents’ positive responses to altruistic acts in social exchange does not tell us to what extent 
these responses reflect trust and to what extent they are only rewarding or outcome-equalizing 
transfers of resources. Our experimental design allows us to isolate trust from these other responses.  
Our evidence is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that donors to charity, despite the fact 
that they have less to transfer back, transfer back significantly higher amounts in social exchange than 
non-donors. Second, we find that, in social exchange, subjects transfer significantly higher amounts to 
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donors than to non-donors because they expect to receive back more from donors than from non-
donors. We also find evidence that subjects reward donors and punish non-donors in both the dictator 
and exchange games. Moreover, we find evidence for inequality aversion and endowment effects. 
Those who have a lower endowment by design receive more in the dictator game than those who have 
an equal endowment, but the latter are trusted more in social exchange.  
An alternative explanation for our findings could be constructed by combining an indirect reciprocity 
mechanism that explains the evolution of cooperative strategies with an argument of maladaptation to 
the game structure of our experiment. Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) show that if a public good game 
is followed by an infinitely repeated indirect reciprocity game, a strategy that contributes to the public 
good and thereafter refuses to help free-riders, but helps other contributors in the indirect reciprocity 
game, can stabilize cooperation in the public good game. Applied to the game structure in our 
experiment (charitable giving followed by a one-shot exchange game) it is obvious that such a 
“shunner” strategy would not be evolutionarily stable because it forgoes fitness-enhancing benefits by 
giving away resources in the last move of the game. However, recently Delton et al. (2011) have 
convincingly argued that cooperation in one-shot games could be a maladaptation. Since the costs of 
mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction are so much larger than the costs of 
mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction, evolution might have led to motivational 
and representational systems in the human brain that are specialized in avoiding the first type of error 
while accepting occasional losses due to the second type of error.  
We acknowledge that the behavior we observe could also be explained by indirect reciprocity theory 
cum maladaptation. Nevertheless, we find our account more plausible because there is ample evidence 
from lab experiments that subjects are very capable of distinguishing one-shot from repeated games 
and act accordingly when playing them (Keser & van Winden 2000; Gächter & Falk 2002). However, 
it is not our aim to discard other explanations of the evolution of cooperation. Instead, we believe that 
kin or multi-level selection plus signaling might have complemented mechanisms based on direct and 
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indirect reciprocity in scenarios where repeated interactions and the accurate transmission of 
information about reputation were unlikely (Roberts and Sherratt 2007; Bowles and Gintis 2011: Ch. 
4). 
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Appendix 
A.1  Experimental procedures 
Our main focus was on Person X decisions. However, since we were also interested in the correlation 
between charitable giving and back transfers in the exchange game, we maximized the number of 
Person Y subjects in Condition 1 (see Figure 2 in the main text). That is, in every experimental 
session, only one subject each was assigned to conditions 2 and 3. The remaining Person Y subjects 
were assigned to Condition 1.  
We chose a within-subject design because we wanted Person X subjects to make their decisions based 
on a direct comparison of the different types of interaction partners and situations – something our 
research question implies. This may have led subjects to be more consistent in their decisions than had 
they decided in each situation independently. However, since subjects’ decisions were anonymous and 
incentivized, and they knew that their earnings would be calculated according to their own and their 
interaction partners’ actual decisions, we are confident that possible confounds due to an experimenter 
demand effect are less of an issue.  
Except for the fact that most Person Y subjects were assigned to Condition 1, the experimental setup 
was common knowledge. All subjects received the same instructions. Instructions explained the 
decision situations of both Person X and Person Y step by step, contained screen shots of the actual 
decision screens, tables listing all possible payoff combinations for both games, and a short description 
of each of the charitable organizations, which all support a humanitarian cause, are well-known and 
have a good reputation. Moreover, subjects learned that their decisions were anonymous, how their 
payments would be calculated, that payments would be administered by a person not involved in the 
implementation of the experiment, and where to retrieve the total donation receipts if they wished to 
do so. This is done to assure subjects that the donation is real, and to rule out other kinds of 
reputational concerns thereby reducing experimenter demand effects to a minimum. 
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After reading the instructions, subjects took a quiz with questions mainly about the decision situations. 
Questions for which at least one wrong answer was given were read out loud and the correct answer 
was explained to all subjects at the same time. Then, the experiment started. After the experiment, 
subjects filled in a questionnaire and could leave the lab to get their payment in private.  
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree.
1
 We conducted one pilot 
session and seven experimental sessions with 16 subjects each (112+16 subjects in total). An 
experimental session lasted for about 75 minutes. The pilot session served to test the intelligibility of 
the instructions and to calibrate the game parameters. Since we reduced the donation amount from 
CHF 8 to CHF 6 and changed the instructions after the pilot session, the data from the pilot session are 
not used in the analysis. Subjects were undergraduate students studying in different departments at the 
University of Zurich. Subjects were addressed via e-mail, were asked to participate in a computerized 
decision experiment where they could earn some money, and could register online for one of the open 
sessions. Subjects were male in 43% of the cases and 24.5 ( 0.596, N = 112) years old on average. 
Subjects received a CHF 10 show-up fee (at that time approximately USD 9) and earned CHF 15.3 on 
average in the experiment.  
                                                     
1 Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178. 
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A.2  Results Tables 
Table A1: Linear probability model of charitable giving 
 (Person Y donated) 
 Coef SE 
gender (male = 1) -0.032 0.179 
age in years -0.042 0.025 
budget PM in 100 CHF -0.000 0.014 
father has university degree 0.225 0.172 
mother has university degree 0.192 0.225 
const. 1.449** 0.455 
N 40  
R
2
 0.18  
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from a linear probability model with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for 
two-sided tests). The dependent variable is one if a Person Y subject made a charitable 
donation of CHF 6 and is zero otherwise. Person Y subjects who wanted to make a 
donation could choose to donate to Amnesty International (AI), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). N denotes 
the number of subjects and R2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the 
model. Two subjects are missing because of item non-response. Together with the 
donation in the pilot session, CHF 174 were raised in total. Donations were highest for 
MSF (CHF 90) and about the same for AI (CHF 36) and ICRC (CHF 38). No 
significant effects of socio-economic variables on charitable giving are observed. 
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Table A2: OLS regression model for trustworthiness 
 Back transfer 3y from  Separate hypotheses tests 
At transfer x donors (1) non-donors (2) F1,41 p 
0 0.692 0.000 0.692 3.16 0.083 
 (0.390) (0.000)    
1 1.385* 1.313* 0.072 0.01 0.929 
 (0.514) (0.613)    
2 2.769*** 1.875** 0.894 1.03 0.316 
 (0.696) (0.541)    
3 3.692*** 2.625*** 1.067 0.92 0.344 
 (0.851) (0.721)    
4 4.962*** 3.750*** 1.212 0.76 0.388 
 (1.028) (0.932)    
5 5.538*** 4.125*** 1.413 0.93 0.341 
 (1.052) (1.024)    
6 7.154*** 5.813*** 1.341 0.55 0.461 
 (1.244) (1.303)    
7 7.962*** 6.188*** 1.774 0.79 0.378 
 (1.373) (1.440)    
8 9.462*** 7.125*** 2.337 1.04 0.315 
 (1.575) (1.669)    
9 11.077*** 7.875*** 3.202 1.58 0.216 
 (1.739) (1.861)    
10 12.346*** 9.000*** 3.346 1.42 0.240 
 (1.931) (2.038)    
11 13.154*** 9.750*** 3.404 1.29 0.263 
 (2.065) (2.173)    
12 15.115*** 11.625*** 3.49 1.11 0.299 
 (2.227) (2.456)    
13 16.038*** 12.375*** 3.663 1.09 0.303 
 (2.349) (2.605)    
14 17.654*** 12.188*** 5.466 2.06 0.159 
 (2.493) (2.875)    
15 19.269*** 13.500*** 5.769 2.13 0.152 
 (2.593) (2.985)    
16 21.000*** 12.375*** 8.625 5.26 0.027 
 (2.753) (2.561)    
N1 = 714; N2 = 42; R
2
 = 0.63 Joint hypotheses test: F17,41 = 2.04, p = 0.032 
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** 
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The model is estimated without a constant and the dependent 
variable is Person Y subjects’ tripled back transfers (in CHF). The independent variables, Person Y subjects’ types (donor 
vs. non-donor) and the 17 transfer levels (0 through CHF 16), for each of which Person Y subjects had to specify a back 
transfer, are fully interacted with each other.  denotes the difference between back transfers of donors and non-donors. 
The last two columns list F-statistics and p-values of single hypotheses tests testing H0: x = 0, for each transfer x 
separately. The joint hypotheses test at the bottom of the table tests H0: x = 0, for all transfers x simultaneously. Person 
Y subjects who did not have the possibility to make a donation are not included in the analysis. N1 denotes the number of 
decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R
2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results 
presented in Figure 3 (“Person Y behavior”) and reported in Section 3.1 in the main article are based on this model 
estimation. 
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Table A3: OLS regression model of trustworthiness II 
 (Back transfer 3y) 
 Coef SE 
transfer x 0.861*** 0.170 
donor (yes = 1) 2.810 2.065 
trans. x  donor 0.403 0.235 
const. 7.147*** 1.445 
N1 714  
N2 42  
R
2
 0.33  
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with cluster-robust 
standard errors (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The 
dependent variable is Person Y subjects’ tripled back transfers. Person X subjects’ 
transfers and whether or not Person Y made a donation are the two independent 
variables. Unlike the model reported in Table A2, this model imposes a linearity 
assumption on the relation between Person X subjects’ transfers and Person Y 
subjects’ back transfers. Person Y subjects who did not have the possibility to make a 
donation are not included in the analysis. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 
denotes the number of subjects and R2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by 
the model. Results reported in Section 3.1 in the main article are based on this model 
estimation. 
 
 
 
Table A4: OLS regression model for trustworthiness expectations 
 Expected back transfer 3y from 
At hypothetical 
transfer x 
donors (1) non-donors (2) eq. endow. (3) uneq. endow. (4) 
0 1.339** 1.179** 2.036*** 1.125* 
 (0.400) (0.427) (0.535) (0.440) 
8 9.429*** 7.179*** 11.089*** 7.446*** 
 (0.514) (0.726) (0.767) (0.577) 
16 18.750*** 14.250*** 20.946*** 16.071*** 
 (0.935) (1.438) (1.126) (1.015) 
N1 = 672; N2 = 56; R
2
 = 0.79  
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** 
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The model is estimated without a constant and the dependent 
variable is the tripled Person Y subjects’ back transfers (in CHF) as expected by Person X subjects. The independent 
variables, Person Y subjects’ types (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) and the three hypothetical transfer 
levels (CHF 0, 8 and 16), for each of which Person X subjects had to specify the expected back transfer, are fully 
interacted with each other. N1 denotes the number of statements, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R
2 denotes the 
proportion of variance explained by the model. Results presented in Figure 3 (“Person X beliefs”) and reported in section 
3.3 in the main article are based on this model estimation. 
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Table A5: OLS regression model of trustworthiness expectations II 
 (Expected back transfer 3y) 
 Coef SE 
donor 9.839*** 0.445 
non-donor 7.536*** 0.726 
eq. endow. 11.357*** 0.610 
uneq. endow. 8.214*** 0.489 
hypothetical transfer x 
  donor 1.088*** 0.067 
  non-donor 0.817*** 0.087 
  eq. endow. 1.182*** 0.076 
  uneq. endow. 0.934*** 0.073 
N1 672  
N2 56  
R
2
 0.79  
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with cluster-robust 
standard errors (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The model 
is estimated without a constant and the dependent variable is the tripled Person Y 
subjects’ back transfers (in CHF) as expected by Person X subjects. Person X 
subjects’ hypothetical transfers, which take only the values CHF 0, 8 and 16, and 
Person Y subjects’ types (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) are the 
independent variables. Unlike the model reported in Table A4, this model imposes a 
linearity assumption on the relation between Person X subjects’ hypothetical transfers 
and expected back transfers. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the 
number of subjects and R2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. 
Results reported in section 3.3 in the main article are based on this model estimation. 
 
 
 
Table A6: OLS regression model of dictator and exchange game transfers 
 Transfer x to 
In game donors (1) non-donors (2) eq. endow. (3) uneq. endow. (4) 
Dictator game (d) 3.054*** 1.089** 1.679*** 2.536*** 
 (0.365) (0.338) (0.389) (0.336) 
Exchange game (e) 7.214*** 4.768*** 6.625*** 6.375*** 
 (0.526) (0.449) (0.439) (0.433) 
N1 = 448; N2 = 56; R
2
 = 0.71    
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** 
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The model is estimated without a constant and the dependent 
variable is Person X subjects’ transfers (in CHF). The independent variables, Person Y subjects’ types (donor, non-donor, 
eq. endow. and uneq. endow.) and the two games (dictator game and exchange game), for each combination of which 
Person X subjects had to specify a transfer, are fully interacted with each other. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 
denotes the number of subjects and R2 denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results presented in 
Figure 4 (first two bars in each tern) and reported in Table 2 (sections 3.2 and 3.4) in the main article are based on this 
model estimation. 
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Table A7: OLS regression model of trust 
 M1 M2 M3 
 (EG transfer x) (EG transfer x) (EG transfer x) 
 Coef SE Coef Coef Coef SE 
donor 0.230 0.424 0.366 0.364 0.770 1.471 
non-donor -0.559* 0.267 -0.769*** 0.270 -0.755 1.041 
eq. endow. 0.372 0.325 0.200 0.259 0.117 0.777 
uq. endow. (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.)  
DG transfer x 0.616*** 0.066 0.457*** 0.137 0.622*** 0.066 
  donor       
  non-donor       
  eq. endow.       
  uq. endow.       
Exp. back trans. y at 0 -0.723*** 0.182 0.064 0.148   
  donor     -1.242** 0.375 
  non-donor     -0.658** 0.207 
  eq. endow.     -0.581** 0.205 
  uq. endow.     -0.719*** 0.191 
Exp. back trans. y at 8 0.243 0.183 -0.058 0.140   
  donor     0.306 0.476 
  non-donor     0.109 0.199 
  eq. endow.     0.154 0.216 
  uq. endow.     0.645** 0.223 
Exp. back trans. y at 16 0.203 0.113 0.303*** 0.094   
  donor     0.102 0.249 
  non-donor     0.284** 0.104 
  eq. endow.     0.257 0.159 
  uq. endow.     -0.006 0.153 
const. 3.395*** 0.774 3.715*** 0.599 3.498** 1.072 
 N1 224  224  224  
 N2 56  56  56  
 R
2
 0.40    0.41  
 adj. R
2
 0.38    0.37  
within/between R
2 
  0.34/0.34    
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with cluster-robust standard errors (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
for two-sided tests). In all three models, the dependent variable is Person X subjects’ transfers in the exchange games (in CHF). Person Y 
subjects’ types (donor, non-donor, eq. endow. and  uneq. endow.), Person X subjects’ transfers in the dictator games and Person Y subjects’ 
back transfers as expected by Person X subjects at the three hypothetical transfer levels (CHF 0, 8 and 16) are the independent variables. 
Model M1 is our main model. M2 and M3 serve as robustness checks. M2 is estimated with individual fixed effects. M3 is a more 
unrestricted version of M1 and allows for different slopes for the different subgroups. In comparison to M3, M1 assumes equal coefficient 
estimates for dictator game transfers across Person Y types (the following F-Test confirms that the differences are not statistically different: 
F3,55 = 0.62, p = 0.606) and equal coefficient estimates for expected back transfers across Person Y types (the following F-Tests for the 
different transfer levels confirm that the differences are not statistically different: x = 0: F3,55 = 1.50, p = 0.225; x = 8: F3,55 = 1.70, p = 
0.177; x = 16: F3,55 = 2.25, p = 0.093). Even though the coefficients for expected back transfers vary between the specifications, their joint 
influence on transfers is significant in all specifications. N1 denotes the number of decisions, N2 denotes the number of subjects and R
2 
denotes the proportion of variance explained by the model. Results presented in Figure 4 (third bar in each three-bar grouping) and reported 
in section 3.3 in the main article are based on model M1. The difference in predicted transfers to donors and non-donors that can be 
attributed to the effect of trustworthiness expectations is CHF 0.42 if predictions are based on the fixed effects model M2 – very close to 
the CHF 0.45 from model M1 that are reported in the main text. 
 
 
